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Operation Boulder, a United States government surveillance program 
deployed in 1972 under the direction of then-President Richard M. Nixon, 
launched a large-scale federal investigation of both Arab immigrants to the U.S. 
and Arab-Americans.
1
 In this context, the term “Arab” is used to mean a person 
originating from an Arabic-speaking country in the Middle East or North Africa, 
while “Arab-American” refers to a person of Arab lineage who was born in the 
United States. For the purposes of this paper, the Arabs and Arab-Americans 
referred to are only those residing in the United States. Before the project was 
canceled due to its overuse of resources, Operation Boulder led to the 
investigation of 150,000 Arabs.
2
 During the operation, government agents 
employed invasive and discriminatory tactics in their investigations of Arab 
immigrants and Arab-Americans. Further, a combination of historical evidence 
and contemporary analysis indicates that these federal investigations intended to 
suppress and divide Arab communities. However, though the U.S. government 
was able to dampen community activity initially, their surveillance tactics 
ultimately resulted in mobilization and cooperation within the Arab community in 
the U.S., resulting in a strengthened ethnic and cultural identity. 
U.S. GOVERNMENT TACTICS 
                                                        
1
 Michael R. Fischbach, "Government Pressures against Arabs in the United States," Journal of 
Palestine Studies 14, no. 3 (Spring 1985): 88-89, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2536955. 
2
 Middle East Research and Information Project, "Operation Boulder Ended," MERIP Reports 37 
(May 1975): 32, JSTOR. 
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A collaboration between United States government agencies employed a 
wide variety of tactics to intimidate, harass, and surveil Arab-Americans. The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
Central Intelligence Agency, Internal Revenue Service, State Department, and 
U.S. Customs Service collaborated on a large-scale investigation targeting Arabs 
in America, both immigrants and Arab-Americans. The initial tactic used to ramp 
up surveillance in the early stages of Operation Boulder was a tightening of 
immigration and visa requirements: the United States government required Arab 
immigrants and Arab-Americans who travelled internationally to obtain transit 
visas. Though government officials originally promised that these regulations 
would only affect those suspected of terrorism, the restrictions were applied to 
Arabs writ large, regardless of their criminal history. This spillover indicated a 
future trend of ostensibly innocent immigrants and Arab-Americans being 
surveilled and targeted based on their national origins alone. Travel and 
immigration restrictions soon expanded beyond a simple requirement for special 
visas: Arab immigrants began to face extra screening when trying to enter the 
United States, which resulted in some visa requests being denied. Further, 
government agents utilized this additional screening as an opportunity to uncover 
small technical errors in the previously approved visa applications of Arabs now 
living in the U.S. The discovery of these errors was used as justification to deport 
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Arab immigrants, though such technical inconsistencies had previously been 
overlooked in immigration processes.
3
 
 U.S. government agencies also employed more invasive tactics in their 
investigation of Arabs living in the U.S. For instance, in the case of the Arab 
attorney Abdeen Jabara, government officials used wiretaps as part of “an 
intensive harassment campaign” that lasted nine years.4 Further, officials also 
aggressively questioned Arab-Americans, even those not suspected of any crime. 
FBI officers made practice of arriving at the homes of Arab-Americans in the 
early hours of the morning and demanding that Arab-Americans submit to an 
interrogation immediately, often justifying their actions to subjects and their 
families with false statements that the person being questioned was suspected of 
involvement in an anti-United States organization. The government officials also 
used exploitative tactics during interrogations, such as lying to detainees and 
telling them they would not need a lawyer. Finally, the U.S. government even 
went so far as to organize burglaries to steal intelligence on investigation targets. 
For instance, the FBI carried out a burglary on the office of a leader of the Arab 
Information Center and allegedly stole the names of the Center’s agents.5 Federal 
use of exploitative tactics to gain information about the U.S. Arab community 
                                                        
3
 Fischbach, "Government Pressures," 91.  
4
 Ibid., 89-91. 
5
 Ibid. 
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sowed fear among Arab immigrants and Arab-Americans and provided federal 
investigators with an ever-growing pool of targets. 
JUSTIFICATION OF TACTICS 
The United States government justified its surveillance of Arab-Americans 
by asserting that this oversight was necessary to protect the security of U.S. 
citizens of Israeli background.
6
 Government officials bolstered this claim by 
pointing to the “Palestinian commando action” that occurred at the 1972 Olympic 
games in Munich.
7
 At the Olympics, a Palestinian terrorist group took members of 
the Israeli Olympic team hostage, killing some and then engaging in a firefight 
that left the remainder of the Israeli athletes dead.
8
 Representatives of the U.S. 
government argued that the Munich attacks could be attributed to “Arab history 
and tradition of extremism and violence which has contributed the word assassin 
to the international lexicon.”9 Therefore, officials posited, surveillance of Arab-
Americans was necessary to prevent Munich’s violence from being replicated on 
U.S. soil. 
However, both data available in the early 1970s and the information that 
emerged from Operation Boulder indicate that the above justifications lack merit. 
                                                        
6
 Fischbach, "Government Pressures," 89 
7
 Joe Stork and Rene Theberge, "Any Arab or Others of a Suspicious Nature...," MERIP Reports, 
no. 14 (February 1973): 3, JSTOR. 
8
 A+E Networks, "1972: Massacre Begins at Munich Olympics," History.com, last modified 2009, 
accessed November 21, 2017, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/massacre-begins-at-
munich-olympics. 
9
 Stork and Theberge, "Any Arab," 4. 
 
159 
 
In 1972, there were no acts of terrorism that were verified as having been 
perpetrated by Arab-Americans, suggesting that there was no precedent for the 
U.S. to initiate such an extensive domestic surveillance program.
10
 In addition, 
through every investigation that was instigated under Operation Boulder, zero 
violations of United States law were ever discovered.
11
 Because the surveillance 
campaign was both groundless and fruitless, contemporary and current minority 
advocates argued that other motivations had given rise to Operation Boulder.  
TRUE MOTIVATIONS 
Pro-Israeli movements likely contributed to the perpetration of Operation 
Boulder, though the U.S. government preferred to emphasize the national security 
justifications for the surveillance program. The timing of a Zionist information 
campaign against Arab immigrants provides support for the assertion that the U.S. 
utilized Operation Boulder to strengthen its ties to pro-Israeli advocate groups. 
Shortly before the surveillance operation was launched, Zionist organizations 
based in the United States warned authorities that Palestinians associated with 
Arab guerilla warriors could be among the immigrants and Arab-Americans 
pursuing education in the United States. Around the same time, Near East Report, 
                                                        
10
 Elaine Hagopian, "Minority Rights in a Nation-State: The Nixon 
Administration's Campaign against Arab-Americans," Journal of Palestine 
Studies 5, no. 1/2: 101, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2535685. 
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a Zionist lobbying organization, publicly reported that Arab students were 
circulating Palestinian “propaganda” in the U.S.12 As the operation progressed, 
the United States government explicitly acknowledged that it was collaborating 
with the Israeli government on Operation Boulder, and domestic Zionist groups 
such as the Jewish Defense League boasted close involvement with the 
surveillance campaign.
13
 In additional, bidirectional information exchanges 
between pro-Israel lobbies and U.S. government officials reinforced the political 
motivations behind Operation Boulder. Up to two years before the operation was 
launched, U.S. government officials sought information on Arab political 
activism, and some of the first sources they turned to were U.S.-based Zionist 
organizations.
14
 Conversely, as Operation Boulder progressed, government 
agencies often provided American pro-Israel groups with information on 
prominent Arab-American political activists.
15
 Evidence of communication and 
collaboration between U.S. officials and Zionist groups aligns with the logic of 
the situation: pro-Israel forces would, naturally, want Palestinian activists in the 
U.S. to be surveiled. Intelligence gathering on Arabs would benefit the Israeli side 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by providing insider insight into Arab political 
activism and strategy. Further, the fear of prosecution by U.S. officials likely 
                                                        
12
 Ibid., 88-89. 
13
 Stork and Theberge, "Any Arab," 6. 
14
 Fischbach, "Government Pressures," 98-99. 
15
 Hagopian, "Minority Rights," 102. 
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deterred Arab-Americans from political activity, which would benefit the Israeli 
side of the political equation. 
Suppression of Arab political activity was also a prominent, though 
unspoken, goal of Operation Boulder. Arab-Americans engaged in political 
activity with the goals of influencing both domestic and foreign policy, as 
liberalizing immigration laws convinced many Arab-Americans that “interest 
group politics” could lead the U.S. to pursue a “more even-handed approach to 
the Middle East.”16 Organizations such as the National Association of Arab-
Americans focused on pressing the U.S. government to back Palestinian interests 
in the Middle East. They believed that tolerance for Arabs abroad would spill over 
to expanded rights for Arab-Americans.
17
 Other political groups focused on 
improving the welfare of Arabs in America, and they pursued this goal by 
engaging in the political process and rising within the government.
18
 The United 
States, partially because they backed Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
did not want pro-Palestinian forces pressuring them or rising in their ranks, 
supported the suppression of this political activity. Michael Fischbach posits that 
surveillance was used first to scope out, then to flatten, the Arab-American 
                                                        
16
 George Fujii, ed., "H-Diplo Roundtable XIX, 2 on Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, and 
U.S.-Middle East Relations in the 1970s," H-Diplo HNet: Humanities and Social Sciences Online, 
last modified September 11, 2017, accessed November 20, 2017, https://networks.h-
net.org/node/28443/discussions/194098/h-diplo-roundtable-xix-2-imperfect-strangers-americans-
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17
 Hagopian, "Minority Rights," 111. 
18
 Michael W. Suleiman, "Islam, Muslims, and Arabs in America: The Other of the Other of the 
Other...," Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 19, no. 1 (1999): 42, EBSCOhost. 
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political landscape. He notes that U.S. government surveillance focused on the 
extent of the associations between Arab-Americans and “Arab political 
organizations abroad.” In-person surveillance and interviews that took place in 
Arab enclaves allowed the FBI to gather information on the political atmospheres 
and leaders of certain communities.
 
Fischbach suggests that the U.S. government 
was deeply concerned about Palestinian influences on U.S. politics and society, 
writing, “[T]he latter concern, that of Arab viewpoints reaching American ears, 
was of equal concern as alleged security threats.” 19 Michael Suleiman argues that 
tactics such as early-morning visits and interrogations were intended to create a 
“chilling effect,” and that they “intended to intimidate and silence political debate 
about Middle East issues.”20 The focus on politically active Arabs instead of any 
actual perpetrators of  violence combined with the imposing tactics employed 
suggests that U.S. government interests were political, not security-related. 
Further, the surveillance’s focus on discovery of more targets and its failure to 
uncover any evidence of legal violations by Arabs in the U.S. indicate that the 
core goal of Operation Boulder was creating enough fear to suppress, or chill, 
Arab political activity. 
Another clandestine objective of Operation Boulder consisted of 
destroying Arab networks of internal community support: government officials 
                                                        
19
 Fischbach, "Government Pressures," 87-90. 
20
 Suleiman, "Islam, Muslims," 41. 
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used targeted tactics in order to entice Arab-Americans to turn on one another, 
effectively deconstructing communities. For instance, when U.S. officials visited 
Arab-Americans’ houses and demanded to begin interrogations, they questioned 
not only their target but also the family and friends of the target. This mode of 
questioning encouraged Arab-Americans to report any possible wrongdoings of 
their own close relations, as well as shifting blame and resentment towards the 
original target for supposedly causing the poor treatment enacted by government 
officials.
21
 Younger Arabs faced even further pressure to report the activities of 
those they knew due to the career- and life-altering threat of being deported 
before obtaining a university degree.
22
 Via these tactics, U.S. government officials 
intended to build up a “network of informers” to assist their investigations. 
Government agencies intended not only to separate communities in order to 
inhibit the formation of political momentum, but also to alienate Arab-Americans 
involved in politics from the rest of the Arab-American community that formed 
their possible support base.
23
 Operation Boulder’s aims to undercut community 
ties serve as another method of creating a chilling effect, as the destruction of 
communities tends to inhibit mobilization towards political activity.  
Some separation of communities did happen through Operation Boulder’s 
successful cultivation of a network of informants. A number of Arab-Americans, 
                                                        
21
 Fischbach, "Government Pressures," 90. 
22
 Hagopian, "Minority Rights," 102. 
 
23
 Stork and Theberge, "Any Arab," 3-5. 
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either because they did not know the law or because they believed they had 
nothing to hide, complied with illegal lines of questioning and implicated people 
close to them, leading to a cycle of more and more illicit interrogations.
24
 As a 
result of intimidation tactics applied by the federal government, pressure and 
subsequently shame circulated about the Arab-American community and threated 
to close down Arab-focused sources of scholarship. For instance, many university 
cultural and intellectual programs that studied the Middle East faced pressure to 
close down due to the intense scrutiny being applied to their activities and those 
of their scholars. The assumption that Arab scholarly views were unreliable or 
unsound stemmed from the U.S. government’s concerted effort to discredit pro-
Arab political views, and this doubt decreased the scholarship produced by the 
Arab-American community.
25
 
 However, though something of a chilling effect was achieved, the U.S. 
government ultimately failed in tearing apart Arab-American communities: 
overall, political mobilization and community cohesion resulted from Operation 
Boulder. Originally, the generation of Arab-Americans and Arab immigrants that 
was affected by Operation Boulder lacked a substantial ethnic identity. Instead, 
the most prominent characteristic shared by Arab-Americans in the 1970s was 
their assimilation into American culture, and most Arab-American communities 
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 Fischbach, "Government Pressures," 90. 
25
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held only fractured pieces of their cultural identities.
26
 As a result, most Arab-
Americans shared few characteristics with one another and experienced a general 
separation. However, Michael Fischbach writes that this disconnect was 
overcome by the Arab-American response to Operation Boulder: Arab 
organizations and Arabs in the U.S. banded together to protest the surveillance as 
a form of discrimination and a violation of rights.
27
 The community response was 
characterized by an unprecedented cooperation between political, social, and 
cultural Arab organizations. For instance, members of the Association of Arab-
American University Graduates (AAUG) published an ad in the New York Times 
condemning Operation Boulder as discriminatory. Even Arab organizations that 
had never before engaged in political activities and did not focus on Middle-
Eastern issues, such as Arab-American social clubs, attached their names in 
support of the advertisement. Elaine Hagopian attributes this change to the 
organizations’ perceived “responsibility to the community,” suggesting that the 
events of Operation Boulder connected organizations to new causes and created a 
cohesive Arab-American community.
28
 Other organizations took on roles beyond 
their original intentions in order to help foster and protect the Arab-American 
community. For instance, the members of the AAUG with legal training formed a 
committee on civil rights to combat illegal harassment. Although the AAUG 
                                                        
26
 Hagopian, "Minority Rights," 107. 
27
 Fischbach, "Government Pressures," 90. 
 
28
 Hagopian, "Minority Rights," 103. 
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never intended to be a body that dispensed legal advice, the pressure exacted by 
the U.S. government motivated AAUG members to pool resources and provide 
services to the Arab-American community.
29
 Changes such as those that occurred 
within the AAUG indicated organizations’ willingness to expand beyond their 
original missions in the service of the broader Arab community, suggesting more 
community cohesion and cooperation. 
 Overall, the U.S. government deployed surveillance tools under Operation 
Boulder in a targeted effort to appease Zionist interests by destroying Arab-
American political activity and community networks. Though some degree of a 
chilling effect did occur, the discriminatory practices perpetrated by Operation 
Boulder eventually led a previously fractured and disconnected immigrant group 
to band together in solidarity, create resilient social and political networks, and 
formally protest the actions of the U.S. federal government.  
                                                        
29
 Ibid. 
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